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In 1967, Judge Marvin Frankel of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York said of the then newly revised federal class action rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, that it "tends to
2
ask more questions than it answers."' Professor Benjamin Kaplan,
reporter for the new civil rules, predicted that a generation or so
would pass before the scope, the virtues, and the vices of the new
Rule 23 would be fully appreciated. 3 But the 1973-74 Supreme
* A.B., Cornell University, 1962; J.D., Harvard University, 1965; LL.M.
in International Law, New York University, 1966; M.A., Harvard University,
1969. Mr. Schuck is Director of The Washington Office of Consumers Union
of United States, Inc.
** A.B., Smith College, 1968; J.D., Harvard University, 1971. Ms. Cohen
is an attorney with the Washington Office of Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors.
1. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,
43 F.R.D. 39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Frankel].
2. Then Professor of Law, Harvard University, now Associate Justice
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
3. Frankel, supra note 1, at 52.
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Court term, with its significant class action decisions4 has accelerated that process. Now, only eight years later, we know that revised Rule 23 constitutes a rather uncertain weapon for consumers
with small claims. The Supreme Court has blunted its edge.
Whether Rule 23 can be honed into a more useful tool remains an
issue for Congress and for future class action litigants.
THE PRito1nsE OF 1966
The original Rule 23 was promulgated in 1938, when the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, uniting law and equity, were first drafted.
That rule was in essence a codification of Equity Rule 38,, the origins of which are traceable through the Field Code of 1848 back to
17th century English chancery practice.0 The pre-1966 version of
Rule 23 authorized so-called "true" class actions only if the rights
sought to be enforced were joint, common, or derivative in character.7 If a right were "several", and common questions of law or
fact predominated, a "spurious" class action could be maintained.
Only those members of the "spurious" class who actually entered
appearances as parties were bound by the judgment; the spurious
class action thus functioned as "little more than a permissive joinder device."'8 As a result of this distinction, the characterization of
the right as "joint" or "common" or as merely "several" was critical and, as might have been anticipated, created "almost total
4. Two of those decisions, Zahn v. International Paper Company, 414
U.S. 291 (1973) and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin., 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Eisen IV] are highlighted in this article. We do
not discuss in any detail a third class action case, American Pipe & Con-

struction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held

that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute
of limitations as to all members of the asserted class. Because of the "subclass action" concept propounded by Justice Douglas in his separate opinion
in Eisen IV, the American Pipe & Construction Co. decision may prove to
be very significant. See notes 183-85, infra, and accompanying text.

5. "When the question is one of common or general interest to many

persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole." 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
6. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, STAFF REPORT ON THE
CoNsumm CLASS ACTION, at 6-8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NICJ STAFF
REPORT].

7. A "hybrid" class action was authorized if the right were joint and
its object specific property. NICJ STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
8. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 351 n.14 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE q 23.08-23.14 (2d ed. 1974); NICJ STAFF
REPORT, supra note 6, at 8-11. Some courts allowed "one-way intervention,"
by which a class member could join after the establishment of liability to
share the favorable judgment, even though he would not have been bound
if the suit had failed. NICJ STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
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confusion" 9 in the application of the rule.
The 1966 amendments sought to eliminate the "pitfall of abstract
classification 'u of rights, substituting in its place a functional description of class action types. In particular, the changes sought to
make the old "spurious" class action a more effective tool. Under
the new rule, members of the Rule 23 (b) (3) class are bound by the
judgment unless they affirmatively "opt out" of the litigation, a
change which differentiates the procedures from permissive joinder and simultaneously places great emphasis on notice to class
members.1 1
Nevertheless, the often-expressed purposes of the revisions to
12
have failed to maRule 23-increased efficiency and rationalityterialize. In the ensuing years, the battleground has simply
shifted: issues such as aggregation of claims, notice to class members, and the distribution of damages now predominate. The maintenance of class actions depend principally upon the risks of inconsistency among adjudications and the practical dispositive effects of
one adjudication upon non-parties. Class actions under section (b)
(1),13 the maintenance of which principally depend upon the risk

9. NICJ STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
10. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAav. L. REV. 356,
386 (1967).
11. Id. at 391-92.
12. Reporter Kaplan noted that the dual purposes of the revisions were
"(1) to reduce units of litigation by bringing under one umbrella what
might otherwise be many separate but duplicating actions; (2) even at the
expense of increasing litigation, to provide means of vindicating the rights
of groups of people who individually would be without effective strength
to bring their opponents into court at all." Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10
B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 497 (1969).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) provides:
(b) An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or

of inconsistency among adjudications upon non-parties, (b) (2),
which involve identical defendant behavior justifying equitable
relief, have generated relatively few difficulties. Nor has the
typical section (b)(3) class action, in which persons who have
suffered a similar legal wrong seek monetary relief, been unduly
troublesome for the courts. Rather, it is a particular subset of
(b) (3) class actions-those brought on behalf of large numbers of
persons, each or most of whom have allegedly sustained nominal
or insubstantial individual damages but who in the aggregate have
allegedly incurred significant loss-which has caused anguish for
courts, litigants, and commentators alike.
THE CONSUmER CLASS ACTION: A NEED UNFULFILLED

The "consumer class action" is the principal member of this
subset (another is the environmental class action for damages14).
The recent Eisen litigation 15 is, of course, the most notorious example. This type of litigation seeks recovery from a defendant
who has allegedly injured a large number of persons through similar conduct, such as fraudulent sales techniques, sale of shoddy
products, misleading advertising, "bait-and-switch" schemes, and
the like. Clearly, a consumer who has suffered a small monetary
loss is unlikely to pursue legal remedies to recoup that loss; barriers
to entry into the judicial marketplace-court costs, legal fees, and
delay among them- are simply too high. As C. Wright Mills
once observed, "It is better to take one dime from each of 10 million people at the point of a corporation than $100,000 from each
of 10 banks at the point of a gun." "It is also," he added, "safer."'1
(2)

the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act

on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class
in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
14. See note 4, supra, and text accompanying notes 48-50, infra regarding
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
15. See text accompanying notes 84-187, infra.
16. WmrTE COLLAR CPanwrxIAL at (G. Geis ed. 1968). See also SENATE
Coinm. oN CommFRcE, CLASs AcTioN STuDY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as CLASS AcTioN STuDY], which states: "Supporters also
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By permitting large numbers of consumers to assert their similar
claims jointly in a single litigation, the class action device can provide an opportunity for redress and, perhaps more importantly, a
17
In this sense, consudeterrent to illegal behavior in the future.
mer class actions are potentially "efficient" vehicles of social justice. They can be a means to shift and prevent losses in a socially
just and economically optimal fashion, at little cost to third parties.18

AmOUNT IN CoNTmovEIsY-THE FIRST BARR=

Because consumer per capita losses are typically small, even
though the injury caused by a defendant in the aggregate may be
immense, the $10,000 "amount in controversy" requirement 9 for
most federal court actions confronts consumer plaintiffs with a
threshhold obstacle. By 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court was forced
to deal with the issue of "whether separate and distinct claims presented by and for various claimants in a class action may be added
together to provide the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in contro22
versy. ' 20 This was an issue upon which the Fifth,21 Eighth, and
24
23
deTenth Circuits had differed. The Court in Snyder v. Harris
cided that, notwithstanding the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, agpointed out that . .. unless those persons cheated out of relatively small
sums of money could effectively band together under Rule 23, large corporations have, in effect, a license to steal relatively small amounts from large
numbers of consumers."; B. Moore, The Potential Function of the Modern
Class Suit, 2 CLASS AcTION REP. 47, 49-50 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE]; SENATE Covnv. OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 5-6 (1970).
17. See NICJ STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 15-34; Moore, supra note
16, at 48, 53; CLASS ACTIoN STUDY, supra note 16, at 30-31.

18. This form of loss-shifting-and-prevention appears to compare quite
favorably with the regulatory form, whose costs are borne predominantly
by uninvolved third parties and whose effectiveness has been widely questioned. See, e.g., THE Caisis OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (P. MacAvoy
ed. 1970); Roger Noll, REFORVNG REGULATION (1971).
19. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1966).
20. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333 (1969).
21. Alverez v. Pan American Life Insurance Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
22. Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 332
(1969).
23. Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394
US. 332 (1969).
24. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).

gregation of claims in class actions would not be allowed to satisfy
the "amount in controversy" requirement.
The named plaintiffs in Snyder and its companion case, Gas Service Company v. Coburn,25 each alleged less than $10,000 in damages. Mrs. Margaret E. Snyder alleged $8,740 in damages, Otto R.
Coburn only $7.81.26 Both named plaintiffs, however, alleged aggregate injuries to the members of the class of more than $10,000.27
By a 7-2 majority, the Court rejected the aggregation, concluding,
[T]he adoption of amended Rule 23 did not and could not have
brought about this change in the scope of the28congressionally enacted grant of jurisdiction to the district courts.
Even though the amended rule had abolished the distinction between "true" and "spurious" class actions, the Court stated that the
statutory "matter in controversy" requirement could not be superseded by the rule change; separate and distinct claims (though
factually and/or legally related)-the hallmark of the old "spurious" class action-could not be aggregated. By 1916, the Court
continued, it was "'settled doctrine' that separate and distinct
claims could not be aggregated to meet the required jurisdictional
amount. ' 29 In support of this proposition, the Court cited Clark v.
Paul Gray, Inc.,30 a 1939 case in which the prohibition against aggregation, earlier applied in joinder cases, was held applicable to
an action brought by numerous plaintiffs challenging the validity
of a California statute imposing $15 in fees for each automobile
driven into that state. The Court deemed irrelevant to the aggregation question the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, even though, as the
plaintiffs argued, the class judgment, the "matter in controversy,"
would encompass the claims of all members of the class except
those who chose to "opt out," rather than merely those who chose to
"opt in." The binding effect of the judgment would be no different than in joinder cases, the Court stated, in which the rule against
aggregation was first expressed. 31
Furthermore, the Court indicated that any rule change which attempted to modify the definition of "matter in controversy"
25. Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
26. Id. at 333-34.

The Snyder case was a Rule 23(b) (3) action.

The

Coburn case, in which the individual damage was very small, was a typical

consumer class action, the injury allegedly having been caused by improper
billing and collection of a city franchise tax by the gas company from
nonresidents of the city.
27. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1969).
28. Id. at 336.

29. Id., citing Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
30. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
31. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337 (1969).
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would clearly conflict with the command of Rule 82 that '[tihese
rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of
the United States district courts .. .'32
In the face of consistent interpretation by the courts of the jurisdic-

tional statute forbidding aggregation of claims to satisfy the "matter in controversy" requirement, Congress had repeatedly raised the
jurisdictional amount and reenacted the section without attempting
to modify the rule against aggregation. Noting this legislative history, the Snyder Court even suggested that the latest change in the
requisite jurisdictional amount, the increase to $10,000, was purposefully calculated in reliance on the non-aggregation doctrine:
It is quite possible, if not probable, that Congress chose to increase
to $10,000 rather than the proposed increases to $7500 or $15,000

on the basis of workload estimates which clearly relied on the settled doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated....

To overrule the aggregation doctrine at this late date would run
counter to the congressional purpose in steadily increasing through
the years the jurisdictional amount requirement. That purpose was
to check, to some degree, the rising caseload of the federal courts,
especially with regard to the federal Courts' diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction.3 3
Rather abruptly, the Court's analysis shifts from precedent and
hoary principle to public policy-" [t] he expansion of the federal
caseload" and the "transfer into the federal courts [of] numerous
local controversies. '34 The fear of adding "to the burdens of an already overloaded federal court system ' 35 was a refrain destined for
repetition throughout the continuing class action controversy. In
light of the purposeful framing of the modified Rule 23 to promote
efficiency, 30 it is ironic that the Court viewed these cases as a potential burden to the courts rather than a potential boon to the quotient of dispensable justice.
Dissenting, Justice Fortas, joined by Justice Douglas, recognized
even in 1969 the crippling effect of the majority's ruling in Snyder
on "agenerally welcomed and long-needed reform in federal procedure."3 7 In addition to its impact on diversity cases like those be32. Id., also citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941).
33. Id. at 339-40.

34. Id. at 340.
35. Id. at 341.

36. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 12.

37. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 342 (1969) (dissenting opinion).

fore the court, the dissenters noted that Snyder would rule out all
similar cases in which jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the
general federal question jurisdiction.8 Many consumer class actions
fall into one of these two categories.3
Fortas sharply criticized the majority's "perpetuation of distinctions"8 9 between types of class actions, the "true," "hybrid" and
"spurious" categories of the pre-1966 Rule.0 Aggregation rules are
based on judicial decision, Fortas insisted, and are thus not "immune from re-evaluation after a fundamental change in the structure of federal class actions has made [their] continuing application
wholly anomalous. '4 1 Congressional silence should not be interpreted as approval of judicial interpretation, and even less should
the raising of the jurisdictional amount from $3000 to $10,000 be
seen to reflect a sophisticated accounting for cases precluded by
aggregation precedents. In any case, it is the new Rule that gov42
erns, and old doctrines which must fall.
Most convincing was Fortas's conclusion that under the new Rule
23,
it is the claim of the whole class and not the individual economic
stakes of the separate
members of the class which is the 'matter
43 44
in controversy'. .

This is so, he reasoned, because the amended Rule 23 focuses not
on the "abstract character of the right asserted," but rather upon
"the suitability of the particular claim to resolution in a class action. '45 Once the court weighs the factors specified in the Rule
and determines that a class action is appropriate, the judgment in38. The most notable specific exception is for antitrust cases. See 28
U.S.C. § 1337.
39. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 346 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
40. After Snyder, the need to litigate about such "distinctions" was evident. For a case in which the court ruled against a motion to dismiss for
failure to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount on the ground that the
claims were "joint, common and undivided, and . . . may be aggregated,"
see Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Public Service Co. at 10 Civil No. 734062 (D.S.D., decided April 26, 1974).
41. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 348 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
42. Id. at 350.
43. Id. at 353.
44. A minority of courts have sustained jurisdiction when the defendant's
potential losses exceeded $10,000 although the plaintiff's did not. See MooRE
FEDRAL PRAcTicE, 1 0.91[11] (2d ed. 1974); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAr COURTS, § .34
(2d ed. 1970); and cases cited therein. It has been suggested that such a
"modified 'defendant viewpoint' is appropriate to apply in all class action
cases, and would produce results more consistent with the policies underlying Rule 23 than does the conventional 'plaintiff-viewpoint'." Note, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregation of Claims: The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALEL.J. 1577, 1592 (1970).
45. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 352 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
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cludes all members of the class and the controversy is defined by
their combined interests. Using the Coburn case facts as an example, Fortas accurately pinpoints the crux of the matter. Mr. Coburn's case, if it proceeded as a class action, would determine not
only whether the Gas Service Company improperly collected his
$7.81, but more basically whether the Company was improperly
withholding taxes from all 18,000 potential class members. All
class members would be affected by the judgment, so the status of
their claims under the old Rule 23 as "several" rather than "joint"
is irrelevant.4 6 Thus viewed, permitting aggregation under the new
Rule 23 would not expand the court's jurisdiction, but would
merely recognize the entirely new "procedural framework" erected
47
by that rule.
The dissenters' view in Snyder is the more appealing opinion in
terms of its logic and conclusion. The majority's precise legalistic
interpretation of Rule 82 and its reliance upon congressional inaction for support only weakly buttress its conclusion that the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 allow no changes in the aggregation rules.
But the prohibition against aggregation had a long history, and
fears of shifting too much litigation from the states to the federal
arena are understandable in light of the delicate balance of our
federalism. Although a different decision may have been hoped
for, it could not have been expected. Perhaps the lack of much contrary expectation and the minimal public or media awareness of
class actions in 1969 allowed Snyder to pass without widespread
scrutiny.
In practical effect, though, the Snyder decision limited class actions to those areas, such as violations of antitrust and securities
laws, in which no amount in controversy was prerequisite to federal
jurisdiction. Excluded from federal court were the typical consumer class actions previously described. State court remedies remain, but are hopelessly inadequate. First, not all states have
class action rules similar to Rule 23 (b) (3), which allow individuals
to bring in one action their similar claims based upon the predominance of a common question of law or fact. The other states' procedures effectively bar this type of class action. Second, many consumer class actions involve interstate conduct and potential plain46. Id. at 353.
47. Id. at 356.

tiffs in many states, so that effective action would require a multiplicity of suits. The Snyder decision has indeed taken a large toll.
A LOOPHOLE CO=KED
A far less crushing blow last term evoked much greater outcry.
In Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.,45 a loophole left by the Snyder
decision was carefully corked. No member of the class in Snyder
or its companion case, Coburn, could claim $10,000 or more in
damages. 49 But the Zahns and the Leazers, as representatives of a
class whose lake-front property had allegedly been damaged by discharges from defendant's pulp and paper-making plant, could each
satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)
(diversity of citizenship) without the need to resort to aggregation.
The sole question confronting the Supreme Court was whether
the other members of the class-the 200 unnamed lake-front property owners and lessees, some of whose damages would "to a legal
certainty" 50 be less than $10,000-could ride piggyback into federal
court via Rule 23. A divided Court said no.
The Zahn decision relied on aggregation rules pertaining to pre1966 "spurious" class actions, invoking the Snyder opinion to "[reject] the notion that the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 were intended to effect, or effected, any change in the meaning and appliamount requirement insofar as class
cation of the jurisdictional
51
actions are construed."
In the majority's firm view Snyder controlled, albeit none of the
plaintiffs in Snyder had a claim exceeding $10,000. That result followed "inescapably" from the Snyder Court's "heavy reliance" on
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,52 where all plaintiffs but one (who had a
large enough claim) were dismissed. Once again invoking Congress's failure either to act or to express a contrary view to that
taken by the judiciary, the Court concluded that the matter was
closed.
48. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
49. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1969).
50. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292 (1973).
51. Id. at 299.
52. 306 U.S. 583 (1939). Indeed, Clark v. Paul Gray could be distinguised on several grounds. Never acknowledged or explained by the majority opinions in Snyder or Zahn is the questionable status of the case as
a class action in the first place; it is much more likely a case solely of permissive joinder. Furthermore, it was decided well before the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, and prior to the expansion of ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. Additionally, the Snyder Court relied on dictum in the case, not on
its h6lding. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D.
Vt. 1971).
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Mr. Justice Brennan, a member of the Snyder majority, dissented,

calling this further limitation on class actions "both unwarranted
and unwise."5 3 With Justices Douglas and Marshall joining, Bren-

nan argued that the well-established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, by which claims not meeting jurisdictional requirements
are allowed to proceed in federal court because of their attachment to jurisdictionally proper claims, could and should be extended to apply to class actions in which the named plaintiffs all
meet the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement.5 4 Ancillary jurisdiction has been extended to a variety of situations,
Brennan observed, in order to bring additional plaintiffs, defendants,
or issues within the reach of federal courts.55 Those rules developed
as5 6 "accommodations that take into account the impact of the adjudication on parties and third persons, the susceptibility of the disputes in the case to resolution in a single adjudication, and the
structure of the litigation as governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ...

[c]lass actions under Rule 23 (b) (3) are equally ap-

57
propriate for such treatment."
Brennan carefully catalogued the reasons supporting his conclusions. Because common questions of law and fact must necessarily predominate in order to maintain the class action in the first instance, ancillary jurisdiction could not be used as a subterfuge to
obtain federal jurisdiction over unrelated claims of nondiverse parties. Class actions were "born of necessity" to prevent massive
joinder or repetitive litigation, both of which place "intolerable"
strains on judicial resources, and their advantages should be nur-

tured.58

Justice Brennan squarely faced the most persistent war cry of
the recent class action battles, the claimed increase in the federal
court dockets presumed to result from class actions. Admitting
"some increase" in the docket possible if, absent the class action,
53. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 312 (1973) (dissenting

opinion).
54. Much of Justice Brennan's logic would apply equally to a class action
where one but not all of the named plaintiffs met the amount in controversy

requirement, although he does distinguish between the "impact on a case
of an appearing party and a nonappearing class member." Id. at 310.
55. Id. at 309.
56. Id. at 305-06.

57. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 51.

58. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 307 (1973).

many claimants would simply never obtain federal adjudication of
their rights, Brennan noted that the same objection applies to
each and every exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. And, he added,
"[i]t should be a sufficient answer that denial of ancillary jurisdiction will impose a much larger burden on the state and federal juiciary as a whole [from separate litigation of the common issues],
and will substantially impair the ability of the prospective class
members to assert their claims." 59
It is not an adequate rejoinder that state class action devices
would alleviate the inefficiency and unfairness of denying small
claimants access to federal court. If the state has no class action device comparable to Rule 23 (b) (3), the result would be "a multitude
of suits," and, lamented Brennan, "the chief influence mitigating
that flood"-the fact that the cost of proceeding alone would exceed the potential value of the claim-"will do no judicial system
credit." 60 Even if a state does have such a procedure, duplicative
litigation in state and federal courts is likely. 1 Thus Brennan specifically looked beyond the theoretical results of interpretations of
Rule 23 to the reality of the injustice suffered by those for whom
the opportunity to proceed alone is no answer at all. Practicalities
such as these, Brennan's dissent pointed out, were considered in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble 62 in allowing ancillary jurisdiction over non-diverse members of a class, once the original named
plaintiffs and defendants had satisfied diversity requirements.
Brennan also demonstrated that the Court's result was compelled
neither by Snyder nor by Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,0 3 which was relied upon in Snyder. Snyder, Brennan accurately noted, turned
upon whether or not jurisdiction could be established over the "action" in the first instance; the Zahns' and Leazers' action, however, was clearly cognizable in federal court on the basis of their
damages alone. 64 And the Clark case concerned only the jurisdictional amount requirements for named plaintiffs; non-appearing
class members apparently were not involved. 65
Brennan refuted the Court's reliance upon Rule 82 as a bar to allowing the class to proceed. Noting that, from their inception, the
Civil Rules have "'profoundly influenced the jurisdictional re59. Id. at 308.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
255 U.S. 356 (1921).
306 U.S. 583 (1939).
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 309 (1973).
Id. See also note 52, supra.
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sult'," 66 Brennan concluded that judicial uses of ancillary jurisdiction have liberally utilized opportunities presented by various
67
rules, Rule 82 notwithstanding.
Finally, Brennan characterized the Zahn majority decision as
jeopardizing almost all Rule 23(b) (3) cases for which a jurisdic6
tional amount requirement must be met. 8 The dilemma had first
been noted by Chief Judge Leddy in his district court decision in

Zahn: "the problem of defining an appropriate class over which

69
On the
the court has jurisdiction will often prove insuperable."
determine
to
possible
be
rarely
it
will
alone,
pleadings
the
basis of
that each proposed member of the class satisfies the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Leddy "solved" the problem by denying class
status to all. 70 As Brennan would frame the dilemma faced by
Leddy, how could the court determine which proposed class members were so damaged that they must receive notice of the proceeding, so they would be bound by the result? The absurd spectre of
"mini-trials" to determine which proposed class members met the
jurisdictional amount requirement lurks behind Brennan's words,
supporting his conclusion that, after Zahn, intervention of class
members might be necessary to establish jurisdiction-"and that is
more than even the old Rule contemplated when it specified7 1 that
class members had to request inclusion in order to be bound."

66. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 311 (1973).
67. The use of the concept of ancillary jurisdiction to expand the court's
reach over an entire case is well-settled. See, e.g., United Mine Workers
of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (related state claim may be heard
with federal claim); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593
(1926) (state claim, asserted as compulsory counterclaim, cognizable in federal courts though federal claim dismissed on merits); Supreme Tribe of
Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (if named plaintiffs satisfy diversity of citizenship requirements, claims of unnamed plaintiffs of non-diverse
citizenship may be finally adjudicated).
The ancillary jurisdiction concept has evolved into a "rule of convenience
and judicial economy." 61 GEO. L.J. 1327, 1332 (1973). The use of ancillary
jurisdiction to reach related state claims, as in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, is considerably more drastic than its use to reach claims of unnamed
class members with less than $10,000 each in claimed damages. 26 VAND.
L. REv. 375, 382-83 (1973).
68. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1973).
69. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971).
70. Id.
71. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 312 (1973). If the
court must call in the whole proposed class to determine who has sustained
$10,000 in damages, the class action no longer meets the efficiency require-

ment. 73 CoLumV L. REV. 359, 371 (1973).

The Zahn decision was required neither by the legal theories expounded in Snyder nor by the policy reasons underlying that earlier
decision. 72 As one commentator noted, in "[a]nalyzing the issues
solely in terms of traditional rules of aggregation of separate and
distinct claims and the purpose of the jurisdictional amount requirement (especially in diversity cases), the Supreme Court [in
Zahn] skillfully avoided all policy questions regarding class actions."7 3 The Court feared that allowing the aggregation sought by
Mrs. Snyder in class actions would shift litigation from state to federal courts, yet no such fear is justified in a Zahn situation: the
named plaintiffs are entitled to continue in federal court, with or
without the class.74 Because named plaintiffs may proceed but
the unnamed plaintiffs must resort to duplicative litigation on the
same legal and/or factual issues in the state courts, the federal caseload would be practically unaffected by allowing Zahn to proceed
as a class action.7 5 And the argument that Rule 23 class actions
must be restricted because they crowd the federal court dockets
"reflects a restricted view of the national court structure since it
ignores the condition of the state courts. ' 70

If multiple lawsuits concerning the same harm arise in different
jurisdictions as a result of the Zahn case, some mischievous conflicts may arise which would have been eliminated by permitting
a class action to proceed. For example, if state and federal courts
adjudicate separate cases affecting similarly situated plaintiffs,
substantive disagreement on questions of state law may frequently
ensue. Such conflicts will appear unjust to the litigants and will
confuse the bench, the bar, and the public who rely upon precedent as a guide to decision making. The requirements of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins7 7 do not eliminate that problem. If there
is no definitive state interpretation or, at best, outdated precedent,
72. According to the noted commentator Charles Alan Wright, the fore-

closure of the Zahn result by Snyder was "not an inevitable conclusion and

it would aggravate the damaging effect the Snyder decision has had on the
attempt to modernize the law of class actions." C. WRcHT, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 72 (2d ed. 1970); Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 184 (1969).
73. 3 CLASS AcTIoN REPORTS 22, 23 (1974).

74. The same result would apply had the Zahns and Leazers brought

their case under general federal question jurisdiction.
75. The CLASS AcTIoN STUDY, supra note 16, at 4, concluded on the basis
of empirical evidence that class actions in general "have less impact on the
court's workload than critics assert and at least in the District of Columbia,
class actions do not appear to place an overwhelming burden on the federal
district court." The Study also found scant evidence of the use of the class
action device as a tool of "blackmail" in a frivolous suit. Id. at 22. See
Moore, supra note 16, at 57.
76. 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 968, 974 (1972). See Moore, supra note 16, at 57.
77. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the federal courts are free to apply the law as they think it would
be applied by the highest state court. The state courts are, of
78
course, free to disagree with federal interpretation and often do.
Moreover, the decision of the first court to rule on a matter that
is pending before several courts at the behest of different but similarly situated plaintiffs may significantly influence later rulings.
This subtle element in decision making was recognized by one federal court in an opinion concerning three class actions which arose
out of one airplane collision. The court noted that an adjudication
in which the defendant prevails is "as a practical matter" dispositive of the rights of others with identical claims who are not parties
79
thereto only because a class proceeding was disallowed.
As noted above, the great blow to consumer class actions was
dealt in Snyder; the Zahn decision was simply a mop-up operation. For in practice, "[t]here are very few consumer class
actions where named plaintiffs will have claims in excess of
$10,000."80 One potentially significant group of cases, however, has
already been barred from the federal courts on the basis of Zahn.8s
With the increasing awareness and interest in matters of consumer concern by local government bodies, it is likely that increasing
numbers of lawsuits may be brought on behalf of governments to
recover losses suffered in their role as rather sizeable consumers of
goods and services.82 After Zahn, the class on behalf of whom
such suits may be brought may consist only of persons with damages of $10,000 or more-few ordinary consumers are likely to be
among them.
78. 41 U. CiN. L. REV. 968, 974 (1972).
79. Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1972). Judgment
for the plaintiff in one of several similar cases may also affect later adjudications. These practical consequences render the binding effect of class actions considerably less important.
80. 3

CLASS AcTIoN REPORT:

22, 23 (1974).

81. In Consumer Federation of America v. Wyeth Laboratories, Civil No.
306-702 (D.D.C., decided October 19, 1972), and two companion cases, two
consumer groups sought to recover monies paid by all purchasers of over
100 drugs found to be ineffective by the Food and Drug Administration.
Each individual's damages, of course, were small. Even the addition of
Dade County, Florida, and the District of Columbia as parties plaintiff, with
each of the two new plaintiffs alleging the necessary amount in controversy,
was held not to cure the fatal defect.
82. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death
Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAWYER 1259 (1970); see In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267-324 (Multidist. 1971).

To be sure, both the Zahn and Snyder opinions apply only to
those cases in which a statutory matter-in-controversy requirement
is applicable. Various consumer protection statutes, including the
antitrust laws, the securities laws, and the truth-in-lending laws,
may be enforced by private suit in federal courts regardless of the
amount of damages alleged. Zahn and Snyder do not affect class
actions asserting rights under those laws. And, of course, Zahn
and Snyder apply only to cases in which damages are sought. Although restitution of monetary losses and deterrence of illegal conduct are primary objectives of consumer class actions, many consumer class actions can and are formulated as claims for injunctive
relief 83 terminating illegal practices or requiring certain actions in
the future.
ENTm Eisen
In Zahn, the Supreme Court had construed a jurisdiction-limiting provision in a manner almost certain to increase the total volume of litigation required to resolve a given number of disputes.
84
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
however, the Court interpreted
a provision designed to expand judicial cognizance of class actions
in such a way that many and perhaps most such actions-at least
those for damages-cannot now be maintained.
The "labyrinthian history"8 5 of the Eisen litigation itself has become a symbol of -allthat is perverse in class actions.8 0 After only
two years of litigation, Judge Lumbard of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit felt constrained to characterize the case as a
"Frankenstein monster posing as a class action. 87 Six years after
that denunciation, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court.8 8 The parties had still not reached the merits and
it was entirely possible that the litigation would begin anew.8 0
83. See, e.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 483 F.2d

723, 725 n.2 (3d Cir. 1973); Yanez v. Jones, 361 F. Supp. 701, 706 (N.D. Utah
1973).
84. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Eisen IV].
85. Id. at 2144.
86. The Eisen case has inspired an abundance of commentary. See, e.g.,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin-Fluid Recovery, Minihearings and Notice
in Class Actions, 54 B.U.L. REv. 111 (1974); Manageability Crisis of Consumer Class Actions: The Severe Example of Eisen III, 7 IND. L. RaV. 361
(1973); Recent Developments, 73 COLum. L. R.v. 359 (1973); Comment,
Zahn v. InternationalPaper: A Further Limitation on Class Action Jurisdiction, 41 FoRDHAm L. REv. 991 (1973).
87. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Eisen Il].
88. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2153.
89. Because the plaintiff had refused to bear the costs of the required
notice to the class, the Court remanded with instructions to dismiss the class
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Morton Eisen commenced suit in May 1966 in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. He brought
the suit as a class action under Rule 23,90 alleging that the main defendants, two brokerage firms which accounted for virtually all
odd-lot transactions on the New York Stock Exchange, had monopolized odd-lot trading and exacted excessive fees in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.91 The complaint defined the
class as all buyers and sellers of odd-lots on the Exchange (this was
later limited to traders during a four-year period 92 ) and sought
treble money damages and injunctive relief termininating the excessive charges.
Eisen I
In the first phase of the litigation, the district court refused to
permit plaintiff to maintain the suit as a class action.9 3 It first
noted the size and diversity of the class, as defined by Eisen, and
concluded that Eisen therefore could not adequately represent
it. 94 The court then buttressed this conclusion, stressing that the
notice requirements of Rule 23(c) could not be met by Eisen and
that "questions affecting individual members predominate over
questions common to the class." All of these factors, the court
held, "suggest almost insuperable difficulties in fair and proper
management of this suit as a class action." 95 On appeal, the court
of appeals denied a motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the
district court's order denying class status was a "final [decision]
action "as so defined," but invited plaintiff to attempt a redefinition of his
class. Id. at n.16.

90. Plaintiff initially alleged that the action met the requirements of each
of the three subdivisions of Rule 23 (b).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. He also named the New York Stock Exchange as
a defendant, alleging violation of provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78aa and seeking unspecified damages.

92. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Tyler, J.).
93. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Tyler,
J.).
94. The court did not explain how that size and diversity militated
against adequate representation by Eisen. Id. at 151.
95. As to the "common questions" issue, the court did little more than
note the size of the class and the apparent lack of interest by class members in the litigation. Id.

appealable as of right" 90 because it was, as a practical matter, the
97
"death knell" of the suit.
Eisen 11

Reaching the merits, the court of appeals reversed and remanded
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether the
suit should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b) (3)08
in view of the requirements of adequacy of representation (Rule
23 (a) (4)), "manageability" of the class (Rule 23 (b) (3) (D)), and
notice to members of the class (Rule 23 (c) (2)).99
The court of appeals majority rejected Judge Tyler's reasoning
that the size of the class and the failure of other class members to
intervene justified an inference of inadequate representation. The
appellate court noted that Rule 23 was intended to apply to such
situations and that other provisions of the Rule, such as that requiring court approval of settlements, safeguarded the interests
of absent class members. 0 0 The court likewise rejected the notion that class size and diversity and lack of intervention necessarily implied the absence of predominantly common questions
of law and fact. 10 ' On the question of notice, which the court of appeals acknowledged to be "the most serious obstacle to the maintenance of the present action, 'u1 2 the court provided no clear guidelines. While requiring an evidentiary hearing to determine which
class members could be identified with what degree of effort, the
court raised an intriguing possibility. Publication might be the
"best notice practicable" even for those class members who could be
identified, the court mused, particularly where individual notice
"would, in effect, prevent potentially meritorious claims from be96. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
97. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Eisen 1]. The Supreme
Court later phrased the "death knell" concept another way. Noting that
the plaintiff's own stake in the case was only $70, the Court stated: "Economic reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not
at all." Eisen "V,94 S. Ct. at 2144.
98. The court of appeals found that since members of the class were unlikely to bring individual suits, and since Eisen's claim was primarily for
damages, Rule 23 (b) (1) and (b) (2) were inapplicable to the instant action.
Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 564-65.
99. Id. at 570. The court of appeals purported to retain appellate jurisdiction pending remand, id., an action whose propriety the Supreme Court
found unnecessary to reach when the issue later arose in Eisen IV. 94 S.
Ct. at 2149.
100. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 562-64.
101. Id. at 564-68.
102. Id. at 568.
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ing litigated."'' 0 3 Having made this suggestion, however, the court
immediately suggested precisely the contrary:
Nevertheless, if the court finds that a considerable number of members of the class can be identified with reasonable effort, and financial considerations prevent the, plaintiff from furnishing individual
notice to these members, there may prove to be no alternative other
than the dismissal of the class suit.104

The court did not indicate any basis for choosing, on remand, between these two possibilities.

Upon remand, the district court made "extensive findings of
fact"' 0 5 and concluded that the suit could indeed be maintained as a
class action under Rule 23(b) (3).'1 6 After finding that plaintiff
would adequately represent the class, 0 7 Judge Tyler ruled that
the "manageability" problem, consisting chiefly of the difficulties

attendant upon computation of damages, processing of claims, and
distribution of any eventual recovery, would not be insuperable.

In particular, he concluded that the distribution problem could be
resolved by resort to a so-called "fluid class recovery," whereby a
fund equivalent to the amount of unclaimed damages would be

established and defendants' odd-lot differential reduced in an
amount determined by the court until such time as the fund was
08
depleted.
It was Judge Tyler's treatment of the notice issue, however, that
was to constitute the focus of the court of appeals decision in Eisen
111109 and the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisen IV." 0 The notice issue really consisted of three component issues: What type of
notice was required for which class members? Who must bear the
103. Id. at 570.

104. Id.

105. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2147.
106. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
107. Id. at 260-61.
108. Id. at 264-65. As precedent for the "fluid class recovery," the court
cited Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp.
710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), approval of settlement affirmed, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d

Cir. 1971); and Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1967).
109. Eisen v.Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), petition
for rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 479 F.2d 1020 (1973) [hereinafter Eisen III].
110. Eisen IV, 94 S.Ct. 2140 (1974).

cost of providing notice? And at what point must the notice be
given?
As to the first question-the type of notice required-Rule 23 (c)
(2) provides that, at least with respect to those class members "who
can be identified through reasonable effort," individual notice is essential. But since approximately 2,250,000 of some 6,000,000 class
members could "be identified with reasonable effort," reaching
only those would cost some $225,000,111 not to mention the additional cost of publication notice to the others.
Stressing cases holding that due process requirements are "flexible ... and must be applied on a case-by-case basis" to ensure fairness to all relevant interests, the court concluded that Rule 23 (c) (2)
simply reaffirmed this principle with respect to notice. 112 It then
noted a fact of overriding practical significance, which the Supreme
Court was nevertheless to find legally irrelevant: 1 8
In light of these purposes, it naturally follows that as the size of
potential recovery available to each class member diminishes, any
incentive class members may have to respond to the notice also diminishes. See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Consequently, where a class consists of a large number of claimants
with relatively small individual claims, notice to individual class
members, as a legal and practical matter, becomes less important
and need not be unduly emphasized or required...
Finally, in determining what kind of notice is required by due
process and Rule 23(c) (2), it must be recalled that expensive and
stringent notice requirements could vitiate the class action device
in situations where application thereof as a matter of public policy
can be important, such as private antitrust, consumer, and environmental litigation. [citations omitted])" 4

The court thus devised a hierarchy of notice: (1) individual mailed
notice to all member firms of the New York Stock Exchange, all
commercial banks with large trust departments, the approximately
2000 class members with ten or more transactions during the relevant period, and 5000 others selected at random from the identifiable members of the class; and (2) notice by publication in four
prominent newspapers. The court also stated that the response
to this initial notice might raise questions as to the adequacy of
Eisen's representation, questions which might necessitate additional
notice.115
Judge Tyler then directly confronted the second notice question
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

At the then prevailing first class postage rate of six cents.
Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. at 265-66.
See text accompanying note 134, infra.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. at 266.
Id. at 268.

[VOL. 12: 39, 1974]

Consumer Class Action
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

-the difficult issue of allocation of the cost of notice." 6 Asserting
that the allocation question was still "an open one" (notwithstanding the Second Circuit's unequivocal contrary opinion in Eisen
1117), that the private treble damage action was an essential element of antitrust enforcement policy, that the statute of limitations
had run against the class claims,"18 that Rule 23 was to be given a
liberal construction, that a large number of individuals were affected by the challenged practice, that a class action would provide
important res judicata benefits for defendants, and that "it would
be unfair to tax plaintiff with the cost of paying for notice at this
point,"" 9 the court held that defendants should share in the initial
costs of furnishing notice. As a means of determining the precise
allocation of costs, however, a preliminary hearing on the merits
(later called a "mini-hearing") was "superior to other possible procedures" and must first be conducted. 20 At the conclusion of this
hearing, the court held that "[p] laintiff and the class he represents
are more than likely to prevail at trial, [and] that defendants
should bear 90% of the costs of ... notice to the class.' 121
The third notice question-at what point in the litigation must
notice be given-was addressed only briefly and inadequately by
116. For a discussion of the rationale for requiring a defendant to bear
costs of notice under certain circumstances, see Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 497-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825
(2d Cir. 1971).

117. Eisen II, 391 F.2d at 568. Judge Tyler glossed over that contrary

opinion, relying upon a subsequent Second Circuit opinion, Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 n.15 (1968). Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D.
at 269. But in the Green case, the Second Circuit noted that plaintiff was
willing to bear the costs of notice, thus obviating any need to consider the
issue of allocation. 406 F.2d at 301 n.15. To say that a question is "an
open one" simply because a court finds it unnecessary to reach it is a curious doctrine.

118. This conclusion is no longer correct. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974):
We are convinced that the rule most consistent with federal class
action procedure must be that the commencement of a class action
suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted
members of the class who would have been parties had the suit
been permitted to continue as a class action.
See Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2154 (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).
119. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. at 270.
120. Id. at 271-72. There was some, but not much, precedent for this device. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
121. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

the district court,1

22

and was not dismissed at all by the court of

appeals or the Supreme Court. It is discussed at some length below.

128

Eisen III
When the case returned to the court of appeals for the second
time, Judge Tyler's heroic efforts to preserve the litigation as a
class action were assailed and utterly rejected. Writing for the
panel, Judge Medina issued a choleric denunciation of virtually all
of the district court's actions on remand and held:
If identification of any number of members of the class can readily
be made, individual notice to these members must be given and
Eisen must pay the cost. 124
If this cannot be done, the case must be
dismissed as a class action.
The court of appeals panel concluded that Judge Tyler's departure from the requirement of actual individual notice to identifiable class members was in "complete disregard of our specific and
unambiguous ruling on the subject."'1

25

In the view of the court,

this error "alone" compelled reversal and dismissal of the class
action.1 26 The court's additional observation-that Rule 23 did
not authorize either a preliminary mini-hearing on the merits or
a fluid class recovery, 1 27 that the case was unmanageable as a
class action, 128 and that there might be circumstances in which the
class plaintiff might not be obligated to bear all costs of providing
12
Rule 23 notice-must be considerd dicta.
Eisen IV
On review, the Supreme Court first considered the question
whether the Second Circuit in Eisen III had properly invoked its
appellate jurisdiction in reviewing Judge Tyler's order permitting
the suit to proceed as a class action and allocating the notice costs.
Relying upon its earlier holding in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan
Corp.,130 the Court concluded that the ruling on notice costs had
been sufficiently dispositive of defendants' contentions on costs
122. See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. at 271.
123. See text accompanying notes 148-78, infra.
124. Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1015.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1018. The court viewed the fluid class recovery as constitutionally defective as well.
128. Id. at 1016-18. The conclusion of unmanageability was strengthened
by the Court's rejection of the fluid class recovery.
129. Id. at 1009 n.5.
130. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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and sufficiently separable from the main cause of action as to constitute a "final decision" appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.131 This conclusion, together with the Court's finding that
"[e] conomic reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class
action or not at all, 1 3 2 appears to uphold the "death knell" doc3
trine set forth in Eisen I.'

Turning to the merits of the notice issue, the Court first rejected
Eisen's contentions that the size of the class made individual notice impracticable, that absent members who did not receive notice
would not be prejudiced since their average stake would be too
small to induce them to opt out of the class, and that adequacy
of representation, not notice, was the core purpose of Rule 23. Relying upon the language of the first sentence of Rule 23(c) (2), the
Court held explicitly that ". . . individual notice be sent to all class
1 34
members who can be identified with reasonable effort.

Next, the Court considered the district court's allocation of notice costs after the preliminary "mini-hearing" on the merits. 13 5
It noted that neither the language nor the history of Rule 23 authorized such a procedure, that Rule 23 (c) (1) in fact required that class
certification be done "as soon as practicable after the commencement of [the] action," and that the "usual rule" required that
plaintiffs initially bear the cost of notice to the class. Distinguishing the cases cited by the district court in which cost allocation
was endorsed, the Court noted that they had involved fiduciary
relationships between plaintiff and defendant: 136
Where, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversarial, the plaintiff must pay for the cost1 of
notice as part of the
7

ordinary burden of financing his own suit.

3

131. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2149-50. See also notes 96-97 supra, and accompanying text.
132. 94 S. Ct. at 2144.
133. See note 97 supra, and accompanying text.
134. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2152. In dictum, the Court also found that
individual notice was "clearly the 'best notice practicable' within the meaning of Rule 23 (c) (2) and our prior decisions," id. at 2151, a superfluous
finding with respect to those members who could be "identified through

reasonable effort."
135. See note 121 supra, and accompanying text.
136. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. at 269-70. The Supreme
Court expressly declined to opine on the proper allocation of costs in such
cases. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2153 n.15.
137. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2153.

Recalling that Eisen steadfastly refused to bear the cost of notice
to members of the class as originally defined, the Court remanded
for dismissal of the class action "as so defined" and expressly
noted that a smaller "subclass" meeting the requirements of Rule
23 might -possibly be defined and that dismissal was "without
prejudice" to efforts by Eisen to redefine the class either under
Rule 23 (c) (4)138 or Rule 15.139

Eisen IV: Unanswered Questions
For all its clarity and unanimity, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Eisen IV leaves open a great many fundamental questions conconcerning Eisen-type class actions. Indeed, one is tempted to conclude that the only proposition authoritatively settled in Eisen IV
was that when Rule 23 (c) (2) required "individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort," it did
indeed mean "individual notice" and "all." Many other uncertainties, however, still remain.
Can massive consumer class actions like Eisen ever be "manageable" within the meaning of Rule 23? Is the fluid class recovery
still a viable remedy and can its availability render class actions
"manageable" which otherwise would be "unmanageable"? Under
what circumstances may the costs of Rule 23 notice be allocated
among the parties? What form of notice is required for those
class members who cannot be identified "through reasonable effort" and what does "reasonable effort" mean? What form of
notice, if any, is required in class actions brought under Rule 23 (b)
(1) and (b) (2)? At what point in a putative class action must
individual notice be given? To what extent can the harsh result in
Eisen IV be blunted by resort to redefinition of the class? Will the
statute of limitations toll while the class is redefined? We discuss
several of these issues below.
Manageability
Because the Court required individual notice to the 2,250,000
class members who were "easily ascertainable" and because Eisen
flatly refused to furnish such notice, it was unnecessary to decide
whether this mammoth class, composed largely of small investors,
138. Id. at 2153 n.16. Although the Court invited petitioner's efforts to
redefine the class, Justice Douglas, in his separate opinion, stressed the discretion of the court in doing so on its own initiative. See text accompanying note 183, infra.
139. Permitting amendment and supplementation of pleadings.
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met the manageability requirements of Rule 23. The Court expressly declined to reach this question' 40 and also expressly declined to address the issue of fluid class recovery. 4 ' And since the
court of appeals decision in Eisen III was vacated, no holding on
these questions remains. As one commentator has noted:
[T]he Eisen III decision-with its offensive language and its holding against the fluid class recovery-has been vacated. Thus, it is
no longer the law in the Second Circuit. Similarly, the Medina
Panel's dicta calling the class unmanageable because the average
member's claim is only $3.90 was also vacated.
...
But by leaving the manageability issue open, the Court has
made possible two rulings: that the defendants, if they lose, are
liable for the full cost of distributing damages as part of the cost
of suit and the damages of each class member can be computed
on the basis of an average overcharge formula. [footnote omitted].142

It would appear that the question of manageability will continue
to be resolved on a case-by-case basis and that the device of a
fluid class recovery will remain available in appropriate cases for
facilitating distributional problems, particularly where, as in Eisen,
large numbers of class members have each incurred trivial damage. The difficulties with the fluid class recovery, both practical
and conceptual, are great, however, and considerably more experi143
ence will be necessary to permit a full evaluation.
Allocation of Notice Costs
In Eisen IV, the Supreme Court squarely held that, at least
where "the relationship between the parties is truly adversarial,"
plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice to the class. 4 4 It left open
the question of whether allocation would be appropriate in other
cases, noting only that the cases cited by the district court involved fiduciary relationships between the parties. 14 5 In between
the "truly adversarial" relationship and the fiduciary relationship,
140. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2150 n.10.
141. Id.

142. SUBCLASS ACTION REPORTS, Interim Bulletin No. 3, at 2 (1973).
143. For some of the difficulties associated with the fluid class recovery
concept, see NICJ STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 182-201 and sources there
cited.
144. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2153.
145. Id.

however, lie a large number of possible class actions, the most obvious category being consumer suits to recover overcharges against
regulated public utilities. 146 In such cases, allocation to defendant
of a portion of the costs of notice may be justifiable, particularly in
view of7 the estoppel advantages to defendants from notice to the
14
class.
At What Point Must Notice Be Given?
While it did not directly address the question of when the individual notice must be given and the issue was not briefed by the
parties, 48 the Court's opinion, with its firm rejection of any "preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit" prior to certification
and its emphasis on the right of class members to opt out or "perhaps participate in the management of the action,"'149 strongly suggests that Rule 23(c) (2) notice must be given promptly after the
class is certified.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court was resolving a false dilemma. By constructing for itself a Hobson's choice-either require Eisen to furnish individual notice to 2,250,000 absent class
members immediately or dismiss his class action complaint-the
Court blinded itself to other possible options which could avoid
either of these Draconian solutions.
Eisen and other class action plaintiffs with small individual
claims who represent large numbers of people understandably
resist bearing the costs of individual notice so long as the outcome of the litigation remains in doubt. By the same token, members of the class are entitled to notice if they are to be bound by
the judgment. These interests of both Eisen and the absent class
members, however, can be substantially protected if the individual
notice is not required to be given until after the issue of liability is
determined.
Delayed Notice: Better Late than Never
Under this approach, the plaintiff would litigate his case on the
146. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
147. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
148. The issue was briefed by amici curiae Public Citizen, Inc. and Consumers Union of United States, Inc. Much of the discussion that follows
reflects arguments made in that brief.
149. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2152.
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merits following certification of the class.' 50

After certification,

some notice short of that required in Eisen IV would be given to
the class members. The form and extent of notice would be a
matter for the court's discretion and would probably include publication and limited individual notice. 15 1 This notice would be calculated to reach the members with the largest stake in the outcome of the litigation. (In the Eisen case, these would include the
member firms of the Exchange, the commercial banks with large
trust departments, and large traders). Those members receiving
notice would intervene, "opt out", or do nothing, as they wished.
If plaintiff prevailed on the liability issue, damages and/or equitable relief would be ascertained and granted, and appeals could be
taken. If defendant prevailed on the liability issue, appeals could
likewise be taken.
If plaintiff prevailed on appeal, the case would be returned to the
district court for assessment of the class's damages. At this point,
notice under Rule 23(c) (2), including individual notice to those
members readily ascertainable, would be required. The cost of
notice would probably be borne by defendant, since defendant's
liability would already have been established. Plaintiff would not
have had to bear those costs unnecessarily in a losing cause. And,
the members of the class would have an opportunity to obtain
their damages.
If defendant prevailed on appeal, only a generalized notice to the
class informing its members of the outcome would be necessary.
The cost would be relatively small and plaintiff would properly
bear it.
The virtues of the delayed-notice approach are obvious. It would
avoid the enormous waste of requiring expenditures for notice to
large numbers of persons which turn out to be unnecessary when
defendant prevails on the merits. It would also obviate the necessity to decide questions of allocation of costs. Most important,
it would enable Eisen-type class actions to proceed to a determination of liability.
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) requires certification of the class "[a]s soon
as practicable after the commencement of an action. . .

."

In Eisen IV, the

Court stressed this requirement for an early determination of the certification issue. 94 S. Ct. at 2152.
151. See, e.g., the notice required in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52
F.R.D. at 267-68.

Several objections to delayed notice, however, can readily be anticipated. Indeed, Judge Tyler considered and rejected this approach.152 He gave three reasons for rejecting it. First, he found
it "at least theoretically contrary to the language of Rule 23 call.
ing for an early determination of the class action question." Rule
23, however, only requires early determination of the certification
question, i.e., whether the action is to be "maintained" as a class action.153 Nothing in Rule 23 requires that full, individual notice be
given at an early stage, though in the normal case, early notice
clearly should be required. Indeed, Rule 23(d) (2) authorizes the
court to require
for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the
fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members ... of the opportunity of members . .. to intervene and present claims or de-

fenses, or otherwise to come into the action....

An order under Rule 23(d) (2) "may be altered or amended as
may be desirable from time to time." And while the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 23(d) (2) suggests that an order under
(d) (2) is subject to the due process requirements of notice contained in (c) (2), nothing contained therein precludes individual (c)
15 4
(2) notice from being delayed until after liability is determined.
Judge Tyler's second objection to the delayed notice approach
was that "in effect it amounts to 'one-way intervention', a procedure the rule was designed to avoid."'" But "one-way intervention"-in which the class member is permitted to intervene to secure the benefit of an existing decision advantageous to him but
is not bound by an unfavorable decision-is not entailed by the delayed notice approach described above. All members of the class
would be presumptively bound,' 5" except for those who opted out
of the class prior to a decision on liability.
Judge Tyler's third objection, and the most substantial one, was
that "counsel for other class members may desire to participate at
an early stage.' 57 However, the delayed notice approach, as
noted above, would require, immediately upon certification of the
class, a generalized form of notice-usually, but not always, less
than individual notice-calculated to reach most or all class mem152. Id., at 271.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)
(1).
154. ProposedRules of Civil Procedure,39 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (1966).
155. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. at 271.
156. See text accompanying notes 168-70, infra, for discussion of circumstances under which the estoppel effect could be vitiated.
157. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. at 271.
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bers with significant claims, as well as some other members.6 8
It must be conceded that this preliminary notice might well not
reach all members with substantial interest in the litigation and
would certainly fail to reach all members of the class. And it is
precisely at this point that some hard choices must be made. Several facts, however, are relevant to those choices.
First, it is true almost by definition that in the Eisen type of
class action under analysis here, few members of the class will,
as a practical matter, have a significant stake in the outcome of the
litigation.' 59 As Professor Kaplan pointed out, the right to opt out
of the class and proceed on one's own is"no more than theoretic
where the individual stake is so small as to make a separate action
impracticable."' 160 Under the delayed notice approach, class members would be relinquishing this purely theoretical and thus essentially valueless right to participate in the management of the litigation on the merits, while obtaining in return a very real benefit:
their cause of action would actually be litigated and they might actually share in an eventual recovery.
Second, any possibility of prejudice to an absent class member
who failed to receive the preliminary notice would be substantially, if not wholly, removed by the previous findings by the court,
prerequisite to certification of a class action, that, inter alia, "the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," that their claims or defenses are "typical" of those
of the class, and t1'at "there are questions of law or fact common to
the class."''
In Eisen IV, the Supreme Court considered these two arguments,
but quickly rejected them. To the argument that the class members lack any incentive to opt out of the class and that they therefore give up nothing, the Court answered that (c) (2) notice was
"an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23" and was necessary to af158. See text accompanying note 151, supra.
159. Class members with a significant stake in the outcome not only
would probably receive the preliminary, generalized notice directed at
them, but might well be motivated to institute a class action (or, in unusual cases, an individual action) independently.
160. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356,
391 (1967).
161. FED.R.Civ. P. 23 (a).

ford class members the opportunity to opt out.1 02 Similarly, Eisen
had contended that adequacy of the representation obviated the
necessity for Rule 23 notice. This argument was also rejected on
the ground that Rule 23 required both notice and adequacy of representation and that the argument implied that no notice need be
163
given.
The Court's reasoning on these points is not persuasive. If Rule
23 unambiguously requires notice, it does not require it at the time
that the class is certified. 6 4 Nor is it sensible to construe Rule 23
otherwise in order to preserve a right to opt out that is almost
purely theoretical and which will, if preserved in that fashion, have
the practical effect of precluding any action from being maintained.
Finally, the assurance of adequate representation does not imply
that no notice need be given; it suggests only that full notice can
safely be delayed without violating due process guarantees.
A third practical consideration-perhaps the most important of
all-is that to require that all class members be notified at the
time of certification in order to permit them to opt out is to ensure
that Eisen-type class actions will not in fact be brought 6 6 As the
Court recognized at the outset of Eisen IV,
. . petitioner's individual stake in the damage award he seeks is
only $70. No competent attorney would undertake his complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount. Economic
reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or
not at all. 66
When, in evaluating the importance of the interest in preserving
the ability of absent class members to opt out of such cases, one
realizes that the alternative is probably no suit at all and a vitiation
of the substantive rights involved, that interest would appear to
be entitled to relatively little weight. This is particularly true in
light of the practicalities noted above. It is one thing to argue that
the framers of Rule 23 intended that, in the ordinary case, individual notice should be given as soon as possible after certification.
It is quite another thing, however, to contend that they would not
have regarded delayed individual notice as preferable to no class
action at all in an Eisen-type case otherwise meeting the stringent
requirements of Rule 23.167
*

162. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2152.
163. Id.
164. Although, as noted above, this should certainly be the practice in
the normal class action.
165. Unless Justice Douglas's suggestions for "subclass" actions are realized. See text accompanying notes 179-87, infra.
166. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2144.
167. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
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There is yet another reason why solicitude for the interests of
absent class members need not lead to rejection of delayed notice.
In fairness to defendants and in order to avoid the "one-way intervention" that the 1966 Amendments were designed to avoid, the decision on the merits should bind not only the parties to the action
but all members of the class as well. 6 8 And in the ordinary case,
a plaintiff seeking to litigate an issue whose merits were determined in a prior class action brought on his behalf would-and
should-be estopped from doing so.
The estoppel effect of a decision on the merits, however, cannot
be conclusively determined by the court rendering that decision;
the estoppel can only be imposed in the subsequent action. As the
Advisory Committee noted:
Although thus declaring that the judgment in a class action includes the class, as defined, subdivision (c) (3) does not disturb the
recognized principle that the court conducting the action cannot
predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; this can be
tested only in a subsequent action. See Restatement, Judgments
§86, comment (h), §116 (1942). The court, however, in framing
the judgment in any suit brought as a class action, must decide
what its extent or coverage shall be, and if the matter is carefully
considered, questions of res judicata are less likely to be raised at
a later time and if raised will be more satisfactorily answered.169
In the subsequent action, as Judge Frankel has pointed out, "at least
the basic considerations going to the fairness of holding [absent
members of the class in the earlier action] bound will be open for
re-examination. Factors which were not brought to the attention
of the first court-including, most centrally, the adequacy of representation in the first suit . . . -may lead to a changed perspec[and] the inevitable mistakes and omissions are subtive ...
u70
ject to correction in fairly standard and unaltered ways.'
Given these practical considerations-the generalized preliminary
notice to be directed at those absent class members with the largest stake in the litigation, the very small probability that absent
class members will want to opt out of an Eisen-type class action,
the required court findings concerning adequacy of representation
and typicality of claims, the near certainty that a requirement of
individual immediate notice will end the action completely, and the
168. See text accompanying note 11, supra.
169. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure,39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966).
170. Supra note 1 at 46-47.

ability of absent class members to prevent a subsequent estoppel of
their individual claims if binding them would be demonstrably
inequitable-it is difficult to credit the argument that delayed notice would violate the due process rights of absent class members
presumptively bound by a judgment, particularly when the alternative course will assure that their claims cannot be litigated at all.
Still less would the rights of class action defendants be jeopardized by delayed notice. The only legitimate interest of the defendant in the notice requirement is that all members of the class be
bound by a decision on the merits in the defendant's favor. And,
as noted above, the delayed notice approach would bind all members -of the class to the extent that any given judgment can bind
anyone. 171 An absent class member could, of course, decide to institute a subsequent suit against the successful class action defendant.
This possibility, however, would be exceedingly remoteindeed,
far more remote than the possibility that Eisen or any other member of his class would have maintained an individual action in the
first instance. 172 For in addition to the financial disincentives to
such a suit, the difficulty in convincing a court that he should not be
estopped by the prior judgment, and statute of limitations problems, the plaintiff in the subsequent action would confront the
most formidable obstacle of all-the stare decisis effect of the prior
decision. 73 Only an extraordinarily wealthy, quixotic, and masochistic plaintiff would undertake such a fruitless endeavor. 74
Under these circumstances, the delayed notice approach cannot
reasonably be regarded as a violation of the due process rights of
absent class members. 75 All legitimate interests of all parties171. See text accompanying notes 169-70, supra.
172. The Supreme Court regarded this as no possibility at all. See text
accompanying note 166, supra.
173.

".

. . it may not be irrelevant to recall that as a practical matter

countless people are being bound every day as a result of stare decisis following lawsuits in which they did not participate." Frankel, supra note
1, at 46.
174. Realizing this, defendants in class actions often move for summary
judgment before the class is even certified, knowing that if defendant prevails on the merits, no other class member will bring a subsequent suit even
if they are not estopped by the prior judgment from doing so. See, e.g.,
Partain v. First National Bank of Montgomery, 336 F. Supp. 65 (M.D. Ala.
1971), rev'd, 467 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1972); Ditlow v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., CA 999-73 (D.D.C.), pending on appeal, No. 73-1396 (D.C.
Cir.).
175. Certainly, the cases relied upon by the Supreme Court in Eisen IV,
94 S. Ct. at 2150-51, namely Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950) and Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962),
did not compel that conclusion on the facts of Eisen. See Jacoby & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rule
23, 12 SAN Dmo L. Rsv. 1, 12 (1974).
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present and absent-would be protected. The alternative-dismissal of the action, 176 and thus of the substantive rights sought to
be vindicated thereby-is really no alternative at all and surely
should be regarded with suspicion under a rule which is designed
to provide a flexible, creative response to the small claim phenomenon:
It is neither a set of prescriptions nor a blueprint. It is, rather,
a broad outline of general policies and directions. As the com-

mentators have
said, it confides to the district judges a broad range
177
of discretion.

Several courts have exercised this discretion by providing for
some variant of the delayed notice approach.17 8 However, in view
of the Supreme Court's clear and unequivocal holding in Eisen IV
that individual notice is required, and its apparent holding that
such notice must be given promptly after certification of the class,
an amendment to Rule 23 will be required to authorize such an approach in the future.
Subclass Actions:

Thinking Small

Until such time as Rule 23 is modified to overrule Eisen IV, the
principal hope for class action plaintiffs must rest on the strategy
adumbrated by Mr. Justice Douglas in Eisen IV. Speaking for
Justices Brennan and Marshall as well, Douglas wrote a separate
opinion concurring and dissenting in part.179 Resonating a theme
sounded by two dissenting judges in Eisen 111,180 Douglas stressed
the increased importance, after Eisen IV, of Rule 23(c)(4)(B),
which provides that "[w]hen appropriate . . . a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the
provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly."
A district court, in Douglas's view, possesses ample discretion to
176. But see text accompanying notes 179-87, infra.
177. Frankel, supra note 1, at 39.
178. See, e.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Industries, Inc., 326 F. Supp.
98, 105 (D. Colo. 1971); Cusick v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor
Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1024-27 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
179. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2153-57.
180. Judges Oakes and Timbers were not on the panel which rendered
the Eisen III opinion, but dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. 479
F.2d at 1021.

play "an active role" in shaping the contours of an unmanageable
class action in order to render it manageable in some other form.
This discretion derives both from its power to alter or amend its
class action order before a decision on the merits (Rule 23 (c) (1))
and from its power to divide a class into subclasses (Rule 23 (c) (4)).
Most important, in this view, the court may exercise this discretion
at its own instance at any time prior to the decision on the merits,
and "no new action need be started nor any amended complaint
filed." 81
While the distinctions between Douglas's position and that of
the majority are not entirely clear, two differences may prove
consequential. The majority's order on remand was the dismissal
of the complaint "without prejudice to any efforts petitioner may
make to redefine his class either under Rule 23 (c) (4) or Fed. Rule
'
Civ. Proc. 15."182
Douglas, on the other hand, would neither dismiss the complaint nor require that Eisen-as distinguished from
the trial court-initiate the redefinition of the class. Douglas
would not dismiss the complaint but would simply permit the court,
either on motion or sua sponte, to proceed to the merits "with the
83
class action held in abeyance.'
If Douglas's position prevailed, the statute of limitations might
not begin to run anew against the members of the class so long as
the subclass action continued to pend, a matter of practical importance in the Eisen case 8 4 and, presumably, in many other class actions as well. While readily conceding that this issue (and the issue
of collateral estoppel in such a case) was not reached in American
Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah,'8 5 decided earlier in the term,
Douglas leaves little doubt that, in his view, tolling the statute
pending prosecution of the subclass action would be wholly consistent with "the purpose of the statute of limitations."' 8 0 If the
statute is tolled and the subclass prevails on the liability issue,
other subclasses might well be able to intervene and take advant87
age of that judgment without being barred by the statute.
181. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2155.
182. Id. at 2153 n.16 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 2154 n.2.
184. "The statute of limitations, it is argued, has run or is about to run
on many of these classes." Id. at 2154 (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).
185. 414U.S. 538 (1974).
186. Eisen IV, 94 S. Ct. at 2154 n.2.
187. Whether such intervenors could assert collateral estoppel affirmatively against a defendant was not decided in Eisen IV. For a pre-Eisen
IV holding that they can, see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747
(3rd Cir. 1974) (en banc). Regardless of any estoppel effect, however, the
stare decisis effect would doubtless be great.
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In that event, the "subclass action" approach and the "delayed
notice" approach would yield much the same result. By permitting

the common issues to be litigated on the merits, before imposing
procedural burdens which may ultimately prove to be unnecessary
or, if necessary, may then become feasible, both approaches preserve the viability of the class action vehicle in the Eisen-type
situation. To the extent that the "subclass action" approach outlined
by Justice Douglas can be implemented without amendment of Rule
23, that strategy is obviously preferable.
CONCLUSION

The triad of cases discussed above leaves two yawning voids in
the consumer protection fabric of federal jurisprudence. Snyder
and Zahn effectively deny access to the federal courts to any consumer who has sustained less than $10,000 in damages and who
must rely upon diversity or general federal question jurisdiction.
And this bar exists regardless of how many consumers share a
common cause of action. Eisen virtually ensures that the federal
courts will furnish no damage remedy for the traditional consumer
abuse involving large numbers of victims each with small claims.
If the typical consumer is not to be denied the protection of the
law, these gaps will have to be filled. As noted above, class actions
in state courts, even when authorized by state law, are not normally satisfactory remedies.' 8 8 Government regulation of business
is at best a crude and ineffective weapon against specific consumer
abuses and, at worst, has perverse effects on competition and on
third parties who have suffered no damage. 189 The proposed Consumer Protection Agency 90 would participate in the regulatory activities of federal agencies, and would thus have little direct impact
on the type of private commercial practices which consumer class
actions usually challenge.
Any successful approach to this problem will have to lower the
costs of asserting consumer claims in some authoritative forum.
188. See notes 60 and 61, supra,and accompanying text.
189. See note 18, supra.
190. See S. 707, as reported by the Senate Government Operations Committee, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. A weaker version of the Senate bill passed the
House of Representatives (H.R. 13163). On September 19, 1974, a fourth
attempt by the Senate bill's sponsors to invoke cloture against a filibuster
narrowly failed, and the bill is undoubtedly dead for this term of Congress.

Small claims court reform and the encouragement of various arbitration schemes present significant opportunities for enabling consumers to act expeditiously and inexpensively in their own behalf.191
Congressional action is another possibility. For purposes of class
actions, Congress could redefine "matter in controversy" to include
the aggregated claims of the members of the class. Such legislation would reverse the results of both the Zahn case and the earlier
Snyder case. A bill to this effect has been introduced, 192 but passage, particularly in the face of judicial concern about overcrowded
dockets, is not likely.
Overcoming the Eisen decision by legislation would be more complex. Manageability should remain a case-by-case determination.
The notice requirement will prove to be resistant to legislative
change if the Supreme Court interprets its holding in Eisen IV
as constitutionally required and not simply as a construction of
Rule 23. For the reasons stated above, due process requirements
can be fully met by provision of notice well short of that mandated in Eisen IV.193 If the Court shares the authors' view on this
issue, it will be a relatively simple matter for Congress to amend
Rule 23 to authorize the delayed notice approach or some other
194
flexible notice mechanism.
An alternative legislative solution receiving some congressional
attention would establish a trust fund of sorts upon which class
action plaintiffs in Eisen-type situations could draw, with the permission of the judge, to defray the costs of notice. In return, a
percentage of the class recovery or a specific amount would be returned to the fund upon successful prosecution of the suit. This approach would be inferior to delayed notice from the efficiency point
of view but would lay to rest all due process arguments.
But these and other possible legislative remedies face significant
political hurdles. Even though a commission named by former
President Nixon endorsed class action suits as perhaps "the most
fair and effective means of adjusting consumer grievances,"'19 pow191. See S. 2928, the proposed Consumer Controversies Resolution Act,
reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Commerce which would
provide federal assistance to small claims courts, arbitration systems, and
other consumer complaint resolution mechanisms.
192. See, e.g., H.R. 16152, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
193. See note 175, supra,and accompanying text.
194. For example, the approach taken by Judge Tyler on remand in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See text accompanying notes 111-23, supra.
195. Jones, Commission Endorses Class Actions, Washington Post September 29, 1973, at 13, col. 4.
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erful business groups regard them with anathema, as perhaps they
should: no other procedural device provides large numbers of consumers with the hope of recovering money lost to unscrupulous
business operators.19 6
Eisen IV inflicted a grievous injury on class actions, to be sure,
but neither they nor other group remedies are dead. Class actions
involving small numbers of persons either with large claims or seeking injunctive relief may still proceed relatively unencumbered in
the federal courts. The use of the subclass procedure suggested 1by
97
Justice Douglas in Eisen could resurrect that suit and others.
And the mandamus remedy against federal officials 9 8 can compel
them to act lawfully, or refrain from acting unlawfully, toward
the numerous citizens affected by governmental actions.
Furthermore, an increasing volume of litigation is being brought
by private membership organizations on behalf of their members
to enjoin consumer' 9 9 and environmental2 00 abuses, among others.
This type of action sidesteps the cumbersome class action procedure
entirely and, while failing to provide damages, can effectively terminate illegal action affecting large numbers of persons.
196. See, e.g., Taming a Legal Monster, Wall Street Journal, June 6,
1974, at 14, col. 1.
197. See text accompanying notes 179-87, supra.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
199. See, e.g., Consumers Union v. Cost of Living Council, 491 F.2d 1396
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1974); Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. v. State Board of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.
Va. 1974).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).

